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MAYBE JUST A LITTLE BIT SPECIAL,  
AFTER ALL? 
LAWRENCE ZELENAK† 
ABSTRACT 
  The attitude—common among tax professionals—that tax is 
special (mostly because of its supposedly unique complexity), and that 
special legal rules should apply in the tax context, has been described 
and excoriated by scholars as “tax exceptionalism” or “tax myopia.” 
The Supreme Court dealt tax exceptionalism a grievous blow in its 
2011 opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & 
Research v. United States, in which it held that the Chevron standard 
for determining the validity of regulations applied in tax just as it 
applied in other fields. One commentator gleefully celebrated Mayo 
as the death knell of tax exceptionalism, declaring, “The tax world 
finally recognized a stark fact of life in 2011: Tax law is not special.” 
This Article offers, with numerous hedges and qualifications, a 
defense of the exceptionalists and of exceptionalism. It makes three 
points for the defense. First, it is not so much tax professionals who 
think tax is special; rather, the view of tax as a thing apart is held most 
strongly by everyone else. Second, to the extent tax professionals do 
believe that tax is special, they resemble antitrust lawyers who think 
that antitrust is special, bankruptcy lawyers who think that 
bankruptcy is special, and so on. In other words, there is nothing 
exceptional about tax exceptionalism. And, finally, to the extent tax 
professionals not only think tax is special but also think it is more 
special than, say, antitrust lawyers think that antitrust is special, they 
may not be altogether wrong. Maybe tax really is just a little bit 
special, after all. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In two provocative and oft-cited articles published more than a 
decade apart, Professors Paul Caron and Kristin Hickman have 
accused tax lawyers of wrongly believing that tax law is special.1 In his 
1994 article, Caron identifies, criticizes, and labels as “tax myopia” 
the “myth that tax law is fundamentally different from other areas of 
law.”2 In Caron’s view, the myth has had unfortunate effects on both 
tax law and the law more generally: “[T]his misperception has 
impaired the development of tax law by shielding it from other areas 
of law that should inform the tax debate. Similarly, other areas of law 
have been impoverished by the failure to consider how tax law can 
enrich their development.”3 Writing twelve years later, Hickman 
describes and condemns the same phenomenon. Her “tax 
exceptionalism” label for the phenomenon is less pejorative than 
Caron’s “tax myopia,” and her focus—on the level of judicial 
deference to be afforded to tax regulations—is narrower than Caron’s 
comprehensive review of tax-is-special arguments and attitudes, but 
her bottom line is the same as Caron’s: 
[A] perception of tax exceptionalism . . . intrudes upon much 
contemporary tax scholarship and jurisprudence. The view that tax 
is different or special creates, among other problems, a cloistering 
effect that too often leads practitioners, scholars, and courts 
considering tax issues to misconstrue or disregard otherwise 
interesting and relevant developments in non-tax areas, even when 
the questions involved are not particularly unique to tax.4 
For those who persist in believing that tax is special, being 
excoriated in the law reviews is bad enough. But having your position 
rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court is much worse. For more 
than a quarter century following the Supreme Court’s landmark 1984 
opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
 
 1. See generally Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up 
To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006). 
 2. Caron, supra note 1, at 518, 531. 
 3. Id. at 518. 
 4. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1541 (footnote omitted). 
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Inc.,5 it was unclear whether Chevron’s deferential standard for 
judicial review of the validity of regulations—under which an agency 
is free to choose, by regulation, any reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute—applied in the tax context. Adherents to the tax-
is-special school of thought argued that a tax-specific Supreme Court 
opinion calling for a less deferential standard of review—National 
Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States6—had survived Chevron.7 Some 
lower courts, including the U.S. Tax Court (Tax Court), agreed,8 and 
for years the Supreme Court left the issue unresolved. Finally, in its 
2011 opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research 
v. United States,9 the Court firmly announced (as urged by Hickman in 
both her tax exceptionalism article10 and in an amicus brief in Mayo11) 
that there was nothing special about tax in this context. Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts declared, “[W]e are not inclined to 
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law 
only. . . . We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should 
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same 
extent as our review of other regulations.”12 
In a Tax Notes article reviewing the major tax developments of 
2011, Mayo provided both the headline and the lead. Under the 
headline Year in Review: Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered,13 
contributing editor Jeremiah Coder highlighted the Mayo decision as 
the most significant tax event of 2011. As an opponent of the tax 
exceptionalists, he made no effort to conceal his glee: 
 
 5. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 6. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 7. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in 
the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 59 (1995); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the 
End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 749–50 (2002); Irving Salem et al., 
ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 
740–41 (2004). 
 8. See, e.g., Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. 
Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 131 (2006), vacated, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). For an excellent survey of 
the confused state of the law on this question (as of 2006), see Hickman, supra note 1, at 1556–
59. 
 9. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).  
 10. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1540–42. 
 11. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondent at 22, 
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 WL 3934618, at *22. 
 12. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
 13. Jeremiah Coder, Year in Review: Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered, 134 TAX NOTES 
35 (2012). 
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  The tax world finally recognized a stark fact of life in 2011: Tax 
law is not special. It took an explicit Supreme Court statement for 
the tax bar to become aware of its run-of-the-mill status, but that 
statement has prompted soul-searching . . . . [B]y and large the field 
assumed for decades that its unique set of issues required specialized 
legal treatment when it came to litigation postures, judicial 
deference, and administrative procedures. That notion was turned 
on its head [by Mayo] . . . . What, a princess no longer, and in its 
place nothing but a common maid? The Supreme Court is not afraid 
to be blunt.14 
In the rhetorical war between the tax exceptionalists and their 
opponents (call them the anti-exceptionalists), only the latter 
conceived of the struggle in global terms. On the anti-exceptionalist 
side, there are two articles (by Caron and Hickman, respectively) 
identifying tax myopia or exceptionalism as a pervasive phenomenon 
among tax specialists. These articles argue at considerable length that 
tax is not special—not merely that it is not special with respect to 
judicial deference to regulations, or any other particular issue, but 
rather that it is not special in any respect. Also on the anti-
exceptionalist side, there is Coder triumphantly dancing on the grave 
of tax exceptionalism. Although there are certainly law review articles 
arguing, for example, that particular characteristics of the tax laws 
justify the existence of tax-specific rules for determining the validity 
of regulations,15 or require a tax-specific approach to statutory 
interpretation,16 there is nary an article comparable in scope and 
generality to the efforts of Caron and Hickman that takes the 
opposing tax-is-special position across-the-board. Nor did any 
proponent of tax-is-special take Mayo as an occasion to publish a 
mournful eulogy for tax exceptionalism as a counterweight to Coder’s 
gloating article. 
The exceptionalist position is, if not exactly correct, at least more 
defensible than might be suggested by the anti-exceptionalist critiques 
and by the failure of the exceptionalists to offer any general defense 
of tax exceptionalism. The purpose of this Article is to offer—with 
numerous hedges and qualifications—a defense of the exceptionalists 
and of exceptionalism. Part I reviews the charges against the 
 
 14. Id. at 35. 
 15. See supra note 7. 
 16. See, e.g., Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, 
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of 
the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 806 (1989). 
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exceptionalists, with a focus on the Caron and Hickman articles. Part 
II makes three points for the defense. First, it is not so much tax 
professionals who think tax is special; the view of tax as a thing apart 
is held most strongly by everyone else. Second, to the extent tax 
professionals do believe that tax is special, they resemble antitrust 
lawyers who think that antitrust is special, bankruptcy lawyers who 
think that bankruptcy is special, and so on. In other words, there is 
nothing exceptional about tax exceptionalism. And, finally, to the 
extent tax professionals not only think tax is special but think it is 
more special than, say, antitrust lawyers think that antitrust is special, 
they may not be altogether wrong. Maybe tax really is just a little bit 
special, after all. 
I.  THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AGAINST THE TAX EXCEPTIONALISTS 
To begin with a bit of brush clearing, the term “tax 
exceptionalism” has several different meanings in the tax policy 
literature. In a usage originated by Professor Kyle Logue, the term 
refers to an unreasonable and impractical insistence on “[k]eep[ing] 
the tax laws clean of tax preference provisions, henceforth and 
forever.”17 In the international tax context, scholars occasionally refer 
to American “tax exceptionalism”—the tendency of the United States 
to adopt and maintain tax rules different from those prevailing in the 
rest of the world.18 The concern here, however, is not with tax 
exceptionalism in either of these senses. Rather, it is with tax 
exceptionalism as the notion that tax law is somehow deeply different 
from other law, with the result that many of the rules that apply trans-
substantively across the rest of the legal landscape do not, or should 
not, apply to tax. 
In his attack on the “myth that tax law is fundamentally different 
from other areas of law,”19 Caron describes and critiques the 
 
 17. Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice 
Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1525 (2000). For other 
examples of the same usage (following Logue), see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH 
CONG., NO. JCX-37-08, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 35 (2008); and 
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE 
L.J. 955, 968–69 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 
U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 502–
03 (2010); Bernard Schneider, The End of Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. 
Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1, 57 (2012). 
 19. Caron, supra note 1, at 531. 
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operation of the “myth” in several areas, including approaches to 
statutory interpretation, the application (or nonapplication) of 
Chevron, and the analysis of choice-of-forum questions.20 In all of the 
areas he considers, Caron’s basic thesis is the same—that tax 
specialists must “start opening up the tax law to the light of nontax 
insights.”21 
Much of Caron’s discussion of statutory interpretation focuses on 
the role of legislative history in the interpretive process. After 
describing at some length the competing views among tax specialists 
on this issue,22 Caron complains that “[m]any of the tax 
cognoscenti . . . have not listened as statutory construction has 
evolved over the past ten years into one of the hottest areas of 
academic and judicial inquiry.”23 As Caron documents, at least some 
of those experts justified their failure to listen on the grounds that tax 
is so different from other fields that those developments had little or 
no relevance to tax. His smoking gun is a passage from an article by 
three former high-level U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) 
officials: 
Much of what has been said in the literature and the case law about 
the uses of legislative history rests on conclusions about the nature 
of the legislative process generally, or in particular cases, that do not 
apply in the tax area today. Federal tax statutes and the legislative 
process that produces them differ from other legislation in such 
degree that the difference is tantamount to a difference in kind. The 
unique nature of the Internal Revenue Code is widely 
acknowledged . . . .24 
Caron also, however, approvingly notes some then-recent nonmyopic 
tax scholarship, in which tax scholars either “enter [into] the general 
statutory construction debate by using tax cases to illustrate their 
particular broad theoretical perspective,” or “undertake tax-specific 
work that generates insights into the process of statutory construction 
generally.”25 
 
 20. See generally id. 
 21. Id. at 589. 
 22. Id. at 532–38. 
 23. Id. at 539. 
 24. Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806. This passage, with the exception of the last 
sentence, is quoted in Caron, supra note 1, at 535. 
 25. Caron, supra note 1, at 541. As examples of the first type of scholarship, Caron cites 
William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 
(1988), and Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445 
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Writing a decade after the Supreme Court’s Chevron opinion 
revolutionized the allocation of interpretive authority between courts 
and administrative agencies, Caron laments: 
[T]he revolution has not reached the tax front. Although Chevron is 
cited in an increasing torrent of cases and articles, it has gone 
virtually unnoticed in the tax area. For example, the Tax Court has 
cited Chevron in only one case . . . . Moreover, the leading tax 
treatises do not discuss Chevron, and the few tax articles citing the 
case generally do so only in passing.26 
Caron does not offer a detailed analysis of why tax professionals 
are afflicted with tax myopia, though he offers several hints that at the 
core of the mistaken tax-is-special attitude is the belief that tax law is 
uniquely complex. For example, Caron quotes the view of the 
previously mentioned former high-level Treasury officials that the 
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) is the “‘lengthiest, most complex, 
most internally interrelated statute on the books today.’”27 Similarly, 
he quotes the Tax Court’s observation that a particular I.R.C. 
provision is “‘part of a complex set of statutory provisions marked by 
a high degree of specificity.’”28 Caron also notes that in a survey of 
Northwestern Law School professors and American Bar Foundation 
research specialists, “tax practice received [the] highest ‘intellectual 
challenge score’ of thirty legal specialties.”29 
For Caron, tax lawyers’ disregard of Chevron is just one example 
of tax myopia. By contrast, the entire focus of Hickman’s 2006 article 
is on the question of whether Chevron applies to tax regulations. She 
is careful, however, to situate the Chevron question in the broader 
context of pervasive and pernicious tax exceptionalism: “The ongoing 
debate over judicial deference toward tax regulations offers an 
especially frustrating example of this tax exceptionalism at work.”30 
 
(1993). Caron, supra note 1, at 541 nn.103–04. As examples of scholarship of the second type, he 
cites Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986), and Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: 
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991). Caron, 
supra note 1, at 542 n.107, 543 n.114. 
 26. Caron, supra note 1, at 556–57 (footnotes omitted). 
 27. Id. at 535 (quoting Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806). 
 28. Id. at 537 (quoting The “Miss Elizabeth” D. Leckie Scholarship Fund v. Comm’r, 87 
T.C. 251, 260 (1986)). 
 29. Id. at 524 n.20 (citing JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 103 (1982)). 
 30. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1541. 
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Hickman presents a two-part challenge to the claim that the less 
deferential approach of National Muffler Dealers, rather than the 
more deferential approach of Chevron, does and should apply to 
challenges to tax regulations. First, in a tour de force of doctrinal 
analysis, she explains why “[t]he common understanding of a unique 
tax deference tradition simply does not accord with the Court’s 
jurisprudence or the pre-Chevron scholarship.”31 Second, and of 
greater interest for present purposes, she considers and rejects four 
normative arguments offered by proponents of the post-Chevron 
survival of National Muffler Dealers.32 Strikingly, the four arguments 
she identifies have little or nothing to do with the primary feature 
supporting the exceptionalists’ belief that tax is special—complexity. 
Hickman begins by considering the proposition that the supposed 
tradition of a unique deference standard for tax regulations provides 
a normative (rather than merely a doctrinal) basis for maintaining 
that tradition.33 She then turns to the argument that the allegedly 
unique severity of the penalties for disregarding tax regulations 
makes the civil tax context comparable to criminal law enforcement 
and that Chevron does not apply in the criminal context.34 Next, she 
considers the claim that the Treasury and the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) have an interest in revenue maximization, for which 
there is no analogue in other agencies, and which leads to a systemic 
antitaxpayer bias in tax regulations.35 Finally, she evaluates the 
argument that a high degree of judicial deference to regulations is 
appropriate when regulations are promulgated by agencies on the 
basis of their special nonlegal technical expertise (for example, on 
scientific or engineering matters), but that drafting tax regulations 
requires no such expertise, leading to the conclusion that tax 
regulations deserve less deference than nontax regulations.36 
Hickman’s refutations of these four arguments are all quite 
persuasive, and I agree with her conclusion that Chevron should be 
fully applicable in the tax arena (as the Mayo Court decided a few 
years later). The interesting point for present purposes, however, is 
how little the four Hickman-identified tax-exceptionalist arguments 
 
 31. Id. at 1589. 
 32. Id. at 1589–1600. 
 33. Id. at 1590–91. 
 34. Id. at 1592–96. 
 35. Id. at 1596–98. 
 36. Id. at 1598–1600. 
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have to do with the tremendous—exceptionalists would say unique—
complexity of the tax laws underpinning the exceptionalists’ belief 
that tax is special.  Because of this complexity, the laws (according to 
the late public finance economist David F. Bradford) “can be 
understood (if at all) by only a tiny priesthood of lawyers and 
accountants.”37 Of the four normative arguments for exceptionalism 
that Hickman considers, two make no claim that tax is unique in any 
deep sense. Other areas of the law also have their traditions, and even 
if tax penalties happen to be unusually severe, that is an accidental, 
rather than essential, feature of the income tax. The third argument—
the appeal to alleged agency antitaxpayer bias—does depend on the 
uniqueness of the tax-collecting function of government, but the 
uniqueness of that function is unrelated to the belief in the unique 
complexity of the income tax at the core of tax exceptionalism.38 And 
the fourth argument—that the administration of the tax laws requires 
less nonlegal technical expertise than the administration of many 
nontax statutes—if anything cuts against complexity-based notions of 
tax exceptionalism. There is, in short, a disconnect between the 
reason that accusations of tax exceptionalism are plausible—that is, 
because it is easy to believe that tax experts think their field is 
uniquely complex—and the bill of particulars presented against the 
exceptionalists. 
 
 37. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266 (1986). Bradford’s 
statement is quoted, not quite accurately, by Caron, supra note 1, at 526. 
 38. As the text suggests, I disagree with Professor Leslie Book’s view that the uniqueness 
of the tax-collecting function is at the core of tax exceptionalism. According to Book,  
[T]he current encroachment on tax exceptionalism specifically stems from the 
changing role of the Internal Revenue Code itself. The modern Tax Code is 
implicated in an alphabet soup of credits and provisions that address topics and 
behavior far from revenue collection. Accordingly, the justification for [tax 
exceptionalism] . . . becomes less compelling as the Code takes on other roles beyond 
pure revenue collection. 
Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing Participation, 
12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 539–40 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
 I suggest a thought experiment for any tax-specialist reader who, deep in her heart of 
hearts, is sympathetic to the notion that maybe the federal income tax is at least a little bit 
special. Do you feel the same way about state retail sales taxes, or the federal payroll tax? If, as 
I suspect, you do not, this suggests that your sense of the income tax as special is based on its 
complexity, and not on its character as a forced exaction. 
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II.  A (LIMITED) DEFENSE OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
As promised, I offer here three points in defense of those tax 
professionals accused of tax exceptionalism and tax myopia (both the 
few accused by name and the unnamed multitudes). 
A. It’s Mostly Nontax People Who Think Tax Is Special 
The claims that the income tax is hopelessly and uniquely 
complex do not, by and large, come from tax professionals (who, 
given their career choice, must not find the complexity 
overwhelming). The claims come, rather, from everyone else—from 
the general public, and from lawyers who do not specialize in tax. On 
the popular culture front, the complexity of the income tax has been a 
recurring theme in tax-related situation comedy episodes from the 
1940s to the present. For example, a 1949 radio episode of Ozzie and 
Harriet opens with the announcer setting the scene as Ozzie wrestles 
with his tax return: “Ozzie Nelson, American, is completely 
enmeshed in what is rapidly becoming one of America’s most 
exasperating traditions. It calls for a complete mastery of arithmetic, 
trigonometry, surveying, semantics, foreign languages (including 
doubletalk and jabberwocky), not to mention mind reading, and—
above all—the control of temper.”39 Four decades later, a 1990 
episode of Roseanne sounds the same theme. Husband Dan 
complains as he works on the return, “This stuff’s so complicated 
nobody can understand it.”40 Roseanne offers to help, but after a 
short review of the instructions she says, “OK, I give up. What 
language is this?”41 
It is not just the average person who finds the income tax 
monstrously difficult. Even the most brilliant minds have expressed 
the same opinion. Judge Learned Hand, widely considered to be 
among the greatest jurists in American history, lamented his struggles 
to comprehend the federal income tax: 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for 
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: 
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—
couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of—
 
 39. The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet: Income Tax Problems (NBC radio broadcast 
Mar. 13, 1949). 
 40. Roseanne: April Fool’s Day (ABC television broadcast Apr. 10, 1990). 
 41. Id. 
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leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, 
but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, 
but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate 
expenditure of time.42 
True, Hand offers the income tax as an example of out-of-control 
statutory complexity, rather than as the only instance. However, his 
choice of the income tax as the example seems far from random. 
Outside the legal field, the man whose name is synonymous with 
genius echoes Hand’s opinion. Albert Einstein is frequently quoted—
including on the IRS website—as having said, “The hardest thing in 
the world to understand is the income tax.”43 Because the quotation 
seems a little too good to be true, and is almost always cited without 
adequate sourcing,44 its authenticity has been questioned.45 Strangely 
enough, however, there is strong evidence that Einstein did indeed 
say this or at least something very like it. The quotation first appeared 
in print eight years after Einstein’s death, in a 1963 letter to the editor 
of Time magazine from Leo Mattersdorf, Einstein’s longtime tax 
advisor and return preparer: 
One year while I was at his Princeton home preparing his return, 
Mrs. Einstein . . . asked me to stay for lunch. During the course of 
the meal, the professor turned to me and with his inimitable chuckle 
said: “The hardest thing in the world to understand is income taxes.” 
I replied: “There is one thing more difficult, and that is your theory 
of relativity.” “Oh, no,” he replied, “that is easy.”46  
If arguably the world’s greatest genius thinks the income tax is “the 
hardest thing in the world to understand,” who are tax professionals 
to disagree? 
 
 42. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). 
 43. Tax Quotes, IRS, www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 44. The IRS website’s “Tax Quotes” is frequently cited in support of the quotation, but the 
website itself gives no source. See id. 
 45. For example, the authenticity of the quotation has been doubted by Snopes.com, a 
website devoted to separating fact from urban legend, which describes the Einstein income tax 
quotation as a “sentiment popularly attributed to Einstein which . . . began to appear only well 
after his death.” Compound Interest, SNOPES.COM, www.snopes.com/quotes/einstein/interest.asp 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 46. Leo Mattersdorf, Letter to the Editor, TIME, Feb. 22, 1963, at 12. For a wonderful essay 
on the evidence relating to the authenticity of the Einstein quotation, see The Hardest Thing in 
the World To Understand Is Income Taxes, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Mar. 7, 2011), http://
quoteinvestigator.com/2011/03/07/einstein-income-taxes. In addition to the essay itself, the 
comments of David S. Miller (Leo Mattersdorf’s grandson) in the comments section are well 
worth reading. Id. 
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The perception of the uniquely byzantine character of the 
income tax laws also pervades law-school culture, as Caron 
entertainingly details in Tax Myopia.47 He describes second- and 
third-year law students selecting their courses as “follow[ing] the 
conventional wisdom that there are only two types of law school 
courses: tax and everything else.”48 He also notes the perennial 
phenomenon of candidates for entry-level teaching positions 
indicating on their form resumes that they are (heroically enough) 
willing and able to teach each and every subject in the entire law 
school curriculum, but for one predictable exception: “anything but 
tax.”49 Caron’s observations on this topic are consistent with my own 
experience of how tax is viewed by law students and law faculty. 
The bottom line is that the strongest evidence of tax-
exceptionalist attitudes—in the sense of a belief in the unique 
complexity of the federal income tax—comes not from the statements 
and acts of tax professionals, but from the comments and behaviors of 
everyone else. 
Moving from general attitudes to the specific question of 
whether there should be one approach for determining the validity of 
all nontax regulations (Chevron) and another less deferential 
approach applicable only to tax regulations (National Muffler 
Dealers), again the finger of blame (if blame there be) for tax 
exceptionalism does not point at tax professionals. Instead, the 
responsibility for the precarious survival of National Muffler Dealers 
for the twenty-seven year period separating Chevron and Mayo lies 
with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who—despite their immense 
wisdom—are decidedly not tax specialists.50 Although the Court 
sometimes cited Chevron during that period in cases involving 
challenges to tax regulations,51 the Court also cited and applied 
National Muffler Dealers.52 Tax specialists can hardly be blamed for 
 
 47. Caron, supra note 1, at 519–24. 
 48. Id. at 520. 
 49. Id. at 521 n.9 (quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Caron recounts a number of amusing anecdotes concerning the lack of enthusiasm for 
tax cases among the Justices. Id. at 525–26. For example, Justice Souter reportedly explained his 
willingness to sing along with the Chief Justice at the Court’s annual Christmas party: “I have to. 
Otherwise I get all the tax cases.” Id. at 525 (citing Paul M. Barrett, Independent Justice, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at A1). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985). 
 52. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–62 (1991) (citing and 
applying Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)); see also 
Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003) (citing Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560–
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thinking that there might be a special deference analysis for tax 
regulations, given the nonspecialist Court’s continued post-Chevron 
approval of National Muffler Dealers. 
As Hickman has insightfully noted, the Court’s lengthy delay in 
settling the Chevron-or-National Muffler Dealers question can be 
largely explained by the fact that until Mayo, neither parties nor amici 
had brought the question to the Court’s attention.53 As Hickman also 
points out, however, both taxpayers and the government had strategic 
reasons for not focusing the Court’s attention on the difference 
between the Chevron and National Muffler Dealers standards, and for 
not pressing the Court to choose one or the other.54 Taxpayers’ 
lawyers continued to cite National Muffler Dealers not out of any 
deep-seated belief in tax exceptionalism, but because their challenges 
to the validity of regulations would fare better under that case than 
under Chevron.55 They were able to assert the post-Chevron viability 
of National Muffler Dealers without challenge because the Office of 
the Solicitor General (Solicitor General) did not contest the point. 
For at least part of the post-Chevron period, the government doubted 
the Court’s commitment to Chevron and was therefore careful not to 
provoke precedents that might explicitly limit Chevron’s scope.56 
In short, for decades the nonspecialist Supreme Court sustained 
the viability of the claim that there was a tax exception to the 
Chevron doctrine. Although tax-specialist litigators were indeed slow 
to urge the Court to clarify the application or nonapplication of 
Chevron to tax, their reticence can be fully explained by litigation 
strategies. There is no need, therefore, to appeal to the prevalence of 
tax-exceptionalist attitudes among tax professionals. As with tax 
exceptionalism in general, so too with tax exceptionalism on the 
Chevron question: there is more evidence of tax exceptionalism 
outside the tax profession than within. 
 
61, on the question of deference to regulations, thus implicitly following National Muffler 
Dealers). 
 53. See Kristin E. Hickman, Response, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or 
Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 108 (2010) (“Until the present term, no tax 
case before the Supreme Court offered anything remotely approximating clear briefing of the 
Chevron versus National Muffler issue with regard to general authority Treasury regulations.”). 
 54. See id. at 110–11. 
 55. Id. at 110. 
 56. Id. at 110–11 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN. 
L. NEWS, Winter 1994, at 1, 14). 
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B. And Besides, Everybody Else Does the Same Thing 
Although I argue that a belief in the uniqueness of tax is most 
pervasive among the general public and lawyers in nontax fields, I do 
not deny that numerous tax professionals also harbor tax-
exceptionalist attitudes—of which the previously cited invocation of 
“[t]he unique nature of the Internal Revenue Code” by three 
prominent tax attorneys is a classic example.57 Practitioner belief in 
subject-matter exceptionalism is not, however, limited to tax 
practitioners. Specialists in other legal fields have similar beliefs 
about the specialness of their fields (although those beliefs are 
sometimes based on characteristics of the fields other than 
complexity). In one other field—bankruptcy—pejorative descriptions 
of “bankruptcy exceptionalism” appear in the scholarly literature 
with a frequency not far behind the scholarly references to tax 
exceptionalism.58 But the phenomenon extends well beyond the areas 
in which it has been given a name. Labor lawyers are guilty of labor-
law exceptionalism, environmental lawyers are guilty of 
environmental exceptionalism, and so on. In other words, there is 
nothing exceptional about tax exceptionalism. In fact, to the extent 
the anti-exceptionalists assume subject-matter exceptionalism is a 
phenomenon peculiar to tax, they are—ironically—engaging in a bit 
of tax exceptionalism of their own. 
In the administrative-law context, the widespread nature of 
subject-matter exceptionalism is described in detail in a recent article 
by Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman on agency-specific 
precedents.59 Despite the purportedly trans-substantive character of 
the vast majority of administrative law, Levy and Glicksman 
demonstrate the existence of agency-specific deviations from general 
principles of administrative law in the case of five agencies. Yes, the 
IRS is one of the five agencies. The first IRS deviation discussed by 
 
 57. Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806. 
 58. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 236–37 (2012) 
(discussing bankruptcy exceptionalism in the context of conflicts-of-interest rules applicable to 
bankruptcy attorneys); Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional 
Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 611–12 (2008) (considering bankruptcy 
exceptionalism in the constitutional law context); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The 
Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 390–91 (2012) 
(discussing bankruptcy exceptionalism with respect to the administration of the law by the 
judiciary rather than by an agency). 
 59. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
499 (2011). 
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Levy and Glicksman is the tax distinction between interpretive and 
legislative regulations for purposes of determining whether 
regulations must be promulgated using notice-and-comment 
procedures—a distinction which does not comport with general 
administrative-law doctrine.60 The second deviation is the survival 
(according to a number of courts) of National Muffler Dealers for 
many years following the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision.61 The 
more interesting point, however, is that the other four agencies with 
agency-specific precedents examined by Levy and Glicksman—the 
Federal Communications Commission, the Social Security 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
National Labor Relations Board62—are all charged with the 
administration of nontax statutes. 
According to Levy and Glicksman, agency-specific precedents 
are attributable to the silo effect, a well-recognized phenomenon in 
the organizational management field.63 They explain, “The isolated 
silo rising above the plains is an evocative metaphor for the 
propensity of departments or divisions within a large organization to 
become isolated, with a resulting failure to communicate and pursue 
common goals.”64 Silo effects are generally explained in terms of three 
types of costs: agency costs (in this context, an administrative agency 
pursuing goals different from those of the government as a whole), 
transaction costs (which make it difficult for agencies to cooperate 
with one another in furtherance of larger governmental goals), and 
information costs (of sharing information among agencies).65 Levy 
and Glicksman suggest that these three types of costs explain the 
tendency of agencies to function as silos.66 
That agencies may function as silos does not by itself explain the 
creation and maintenance of agency-specific precedents by generalist 
judges, but Levy and Glicksman plausibly suggest an explanation 
based on information costs: “[W]e think the critical factor is the 
 
 60. Id. at 515–23. 
 61. Id. at 524–25. Levy and Glicksman wrote their article shortly before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mayo, although the article’s publication date was shortly after the issuance 
of the Court’s decision. 
 62. Id. at 526–51. 
 63. See id. at 510 & n.75 (collecting sources on the silo effect). 
 64. Id. at 510. To less peaceable minds, the image evoked by the silo effect may be of a 
missile silo, rather than a grain silo. 
 65. Id. at 512–14. 
 66. Id. 
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judicial-review process itself, in which the courts rely heavily on the 
attorneys representing the parties as providers of information 
regarding precedents.”67 Those attorneys tend to be specialists (in tax 
law, environmental law, or labor law, for instance), and “practitioner 
specialization affects marginal information costs so as to 
induce . . . silo effects because the marginal costs of finding and 
analyzing agency-specific precedents are small, while the costs of 
moving beyond the agency may be significantly greater and the 
marginal benefits of doing so are typically relatively small.”68 
Silo effects—and thus subject-matter exceptionalism—are to be 
expected in any specialized area of the law. When an area of the law 
is both highly specialized and large (in the sense of generating an 
impressive number of judicial precedents), as in the case of federal 
tax law, subject-matter exceptionalism is likely to be especially 
pervasive. The large quantity of reported cases makes it likely there 
will be cases on point from within the field, thus making it 
unnecessary—or at least not obviously necessary—to search for 
precedents from other areas of the law. And the difficulty of keeping 
up with even in-field legal developments leaves practitioners with 
little time for a hunt—seemingly unnecessary in any event—for 
relevant cases from outside the field. 
As it happens, the everybody-does-it nature of subject-matter 
exceptionalism is well-illustrated in the specific context that has 
served as Exhibit A in the case against tax exceptionalism—standards 
of judicial deference to regulations in the post-Chevron era. Writing 
eight years after Chevron, Professor Thomas Merrill observes that the 
Supreme Court itself had applied “the Chevron framework . . . in only 
about half the cases that the Court perceive[d] as presenting a 
deference question.”69 Merrill also notes that the Court was especially 
disposed to ignore Chevron “in areas where there is a particularly rich 
tradition of pre-Chevron precedent on deference.”70 Merrill mentions 
five areas—Title VII, labor, tax, social security, and the 
 
 67. Id. at 557. 
 68. Id. at 561. 
 69. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 
(1992). 
 70. Id. at 983 n.56; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1107–08 (noting the Supreme Court’s tendency to ignore Chevron 
in the contexts of labor law, immigration, treaty interpretation, sentencing, education, and 
regulated industries, in addition to tax). 
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environment—in which the Court “still tend[ed] to frame the 
deference standard in the terms expressed in earlier decisions specific 
to these areas, rather than in terms of Chevron.”71 It is not a 
coincidence that four of the five legal areas mentioned by Merrill are 
among the five areas used by Levy and Glicksman to illustrate the 
phenomenon of agency-specific precedents (despite the fact that Levy 
and Glicksman discuss the Chevron question only in the tax 
context).72 The fields of labor, tax, social security, and the 
environment all feature the high degree of specialization and the 
substantial body of case law conducive to the development of subject-
matter exceptionalism. 
Thus, a more specific observation can be added to the general 
observation that lawyers (and judges) practice subject-matter 
exceptionalism in every specialized area of the law, not just tax: 
exceptionalism on the very issue that has been offered as the leading 
example of tax exceptionalism—deference standards in the aftermath 
of Chevron—turns out to be not exceptional. 
C. What’s More, It’s Not Necessarily Wrong (Sort of) 
If practiced with care and nuance, subject-matter 
exceptionalism—in tax or elsewhere—may be perfectly appropriate. 
Although it makes sense to place the burden of persuasion on those 
claiming (in whatever context) that tax is meaningfully different, in 
some cases they may be able to carry that burden. Whether the 
question is the proper approach to statutory interpretation, the extent 
of judicial deference to regulations, or any other issue, the same rules 
should apply trans-substantively to the extent the circumstances 
justifying the rule exist trans-substantively. But different rules may be 
appropriate to the extent that the change in the legal context changes 
the relevant circumstances. Hickman herself has made this point,73 
 
 71. Id. (citing Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (tax); EEOC v. Arabian 
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (Title VII); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 
U.S. 332 (1989) (the environment); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (social security); 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Title VII); NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 
469 U.S. 490 (1985) (labor)). 
 72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the 
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1157–58 (2010) (“One of us [Hickman] has publicly 
rejected arguments favoring tax exceptionalism. We assume for now that tax and other 
regulatory regimes differ in degree rather than in kind, but accept as possible that further 
development of our theory may establish the tax regime as meaningfully different in kind . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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and the point is implicit in the Supreme Court’s statement in Mayo 
that “in the absence of such justification [for a special rule for tax], we 
are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review 
good for tax law only.”74 Nevertheless, the point is easily missed in the 
general condemnation of tax exceptionalism and tax myopia. 
As an example, consider the argument advanced by some tax 
exceptionalists that tax regulations should enjoy less deference than 
other regulations because Treasury and the IRS have an antitaxpayer 
bias that has no parallel outside the tax context. The idea is that the 
question of the validity of nontax regulations often arises in litigation 
between private parties, as to which the regulation-writing agency is a 
disinterested third party, whereas the question of the validity of tax 
regulations arises in tax litigation in which the agency is a party with a 
direct financial interest.75 
Hickman is unpersuaded by this claim, largely because the 
number of “strikingly protaxpayer” tax regulations on the books 
undercuts the claim of a systemic antitaxpayer bias among tax 
regulation writers.76 I share Hickman’s view.77 But what if the 
exceptionalists’ empirical claims on this point happened to be more 
persuasive? Suppose that Treasury and the IRS were uniquely 
situated among agencies in having a direct financial interest in the 
application of their regulations and in their status as litigants in cases 
 
 74. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 75. See Gans, supra note 7, at 758 (suggesting agency bias resulting from the agency’s status 
as the taxpayer’s adversary in litigation); Salem et al., supra note 7, at 724–25 (suggesting agency 
bias resulting from a revenue-maximizing agenda). 
 76. Hickman, supra note 1, at 1596. 
 77. In fact, the IRS not infrequently takes positions so protaxpayer they cannot be 
reconciled with the Code. For a discussion, see generally Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the 
Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012). For the most 
part, however, rather than displaying an anti- or protaxpayer bias, the IRS appears to make an 
honest attempt to adhere to the “Statement of Principles of Internal Revenue Tax 
Administration” that formerly appeared at the beginning of each Internal Revenue Bulletin: 
It is the responsibility of each person in the Service, charged with the duty of 
interpreting the law, to try to find the true meaning of the statutory provision and not 
to adopt a strained construction in the belief that he or she is “protecting the 
revenue.” The revenue is properly protected only when we ascertain and apply the 
true meaning of the statute. 
See 1999-8 I.R.B. 2 (containing the last appearance of the “Statement of Principles”). In lieu of 
the “Statement of Principles,” Internal Revenue Bulletins now announce that “[t]he IRS 
Mission” is to “[p]rovide America’s taxpayers top-quality service by helping them understand 
and meet their tax responsibilities,” and to “enforce the law with integrity and fairness for all.” 
See, e.g., 2014-14 I.R.B. intro. The quoted language from the “Statement of Principles” 
originated (albeit without “or she”) in Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689, which is still in force. 
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involving the validity of those regulations. Suppose also that objective 
observers concluded the result was a systemic antitaxpayer bias in tax 
regulations. If all that were true, there would be merit to the claim 
that courts should adopt a less deferential approach in their review of 
tax regulations than in their review of nontax regulations. 
In such hypothetical circumstances, tax exceptionalism would be 
at least defensible, perhaps even compelling. Notice, however, that 
even then the exceptionalism would be accidental or contingent, in 
the sense that if the same circumstances—agency financial interest, 
adversarial status, and a resulting bias in the writing of regulations—
could be shown to exist in some nontax context,78 then the less 
deferential standard would apply just as much in that context as in the 
tax context. Whether this would still be exceptionalism (tax-and-
something-else exceptionalism) is a question of labels, not of 
substance. The larger the number of agencies as to which the 
circumstances justifying less deference exist, the less it looks like 
exceptionalism and the more it looks like the application of a general 
rule that there are two deference standards—one for when the 
circumstances exist, and the other for when they do not. But the 
system could be described in precisely the same way even if tax 
happened to be the only area in which the circumstances obtained. 
Whether one describes that as exceptionalism or as the application of 
general principles to a set that happens to have only one member, the 
treatment would be justified. To be clear: the particulars of the 
antitaxpayer bias argument for less deference are far from persuasive, 
but the structure of that argument could legitimately be used (with 
better particulars) to make the case for subject-matter 
exceptionalism—but always with the caveat that the exceptional 
treatment would be extended to any other area in which the same 
special circumstances existed. 
Essentially the same analysis applies to the question of whether 
the process of interpreting the I.R.C. is radically different from the 
interpretation of other statutes. It is at least arguable that a short and 
simple statute expressed in vague and general terms calls for a 
fundamentally different interpretive approach than a lengthy and 
 
 78. For example, similar circumstances could exist, at least to some extent, with respect to 
the regulations of the Federal Acquisition Regulation System. 
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intricate statute.79 The Supreme Court’s 1968 opinion in 
Commissioner v. Gordon,80 a corporate tax case, suggests as much: 
“The requirements of [I.R.C. § 355] are detailed and specific, and 
must be applied with precision.”81 For the sake of the argument that 
follows, let us suppose that simple and complex statutes call for 
different interpretive approaches. If it happens that federal tax law is 
characterized by long and intricate statutory provisions and antitrust 
law, for instance, by short and vague provisions, then the differing 
approaches to interpreting the statutes in the two fields may be 
viewed as an instance of subject-matter exceptionalism.82 
There is, however, another and better way to think about this. 
The same overarching interpretive rules—read simple statutes one 
way and complex statutes another—apply trans-substantively. Even if 
all tax statutes were complex and all antitrust statutes were simple, 
the resulting different ways of reading each statute could be viewed as 
the consistent application of the same overarching rules, rather than 
as subject-matter exceptionalism. But there is no need to argue that 
hypothetical case, because within the long and intricate I.R.C. lurk 
many short and simple (and vague) passages. Those passages are 
interpreted according to the rules for simple statutes; they are not 
interpreted as if they were complex merely because they are tax 
statutes and tax statutes are usually complex. A classic example is the 
Supreme Court’s 1960 opinion in Commissioner v. Duberstein,83 in 
which the Court was called upon to interpret the longstanding 
exclusion from gross income of “the value of property acquired by 
gift.”84 Guided by the simplicity and vagueness of the provision, rather 
than by the fact that it was a tax provision, the Court wrote: “We are 
of opinion that the governing principles are necessarily 
general . . . and that the problem is one which, under the present 
statutory framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive 
 
 79. The two types of statutes might also call for different analyses under Chevron of the 
range of permissible regulatory interpretations; the regulation-writing agency would be more 
constrained by the lengthy and intricate statute than by the short and vague one. 
 80. Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 81. Id. at 91–92. 
 82. Whether one approach or the other is viewed as the exceptional case will depend on 
the viewer’s understanding of the typical level of statutory complexity. 
 83. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
 84. Id. at 279–80 (quotation marks omitted). The exclusion is now codified at 
I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012). In the years before Duberstein, the same language appeared at § 22(b)(3) 
of the 1939 Code. I.R.C. § 22(b)(3) (Supp. V 1939). 
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statement . . . .”85 As long as the choice of interpretive approach is 
governed by the character of the specific provision to be interpreted, 
rather than by the character of the provision as a tax or nontax 
statute, I would argue that subject-matter exceptionalism is not being 
practiced—not even if 90 percent of the tax provisions at issue in the 
cases happen to be of the Gordon type rather than the Duberstein 
type. 
Many years ago, I published an article arguing that the 
interpretation of the I.R.C. simultaneously was and was not special, 
for the same reasons expressed (much more succinctly) above.86 The 
key passage on the special-or-not question read: 
Interpreting statutes is not a task unique to the practice of tax law. 
The principles that apply to the interpretation of any statute apply 
to the interpretation of the Code as well. But the unique complexity 
of the Code makes it more than just another statute, and for that 
reason the question of when nonliteral interpretations of the Code 
are appropriate merits separate discussion from the appropriateness 
of nonliteral interpretations of statutes in general.87 
Was the former self who wrote that passage a tax exceptionalist 
suffering from tax myopia (although the terms were not yet in 
circulation), or did he see tax as part of the legal mainstream? Other 
scholars have disagreed on the answer to that question. Caron cites 
and discusses the article approvingly, as an example of nonmyopic 
“tax-specific work that generates insights into the process of statutory 
construction generally.”88 Professor Michael Livingston is of a 
different opinion in his 1996 article on the interpretation of tax 
statutes.89 Except for the nonuse of the tax exceptionalism label (he 
refers to “tax essentialism” instead),90 Livingston’s article is to tax-is-
special claims about statutory interpretation as Hickman’s article is to 
 
 85. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 284. 
 86. Zelenak, supra note 25, at 630. 
 87. Id. at 630 (footnote omitted). If I were revising this passage today, I would replace 
“unique” with “extreme” or “unusual,” in recognition of my limited knowledge of the 
complexity of all other federal statutes. 
 88. Caron, supra note 1, at 541; see id. at 542–43 (quoting Zelenak, supra note 25, at 630, 
and discussing the article). 
 89. Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax 
Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996). 
 90. Livingston cites approvingly Caron’s critique of “[t]ax [m]yopia,” id. at 710, and in 
passing suggests a term of his own—“tax essentialism,” id. at 711—but Livingston appears not 
much interested in naming the phenomenon he critiques. 
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tax-is-special claims in the Chevron context. In opposition to “[t]he 
sense . . . that tax law is somehow special, that it has nuances and 
pitfalls unfathomable to the outsider,”91 Livingston poses a rhetorical 
question: “What right does any area of law have to set itself apart, 
proclaiming that its norms and methods are different from everyone 
else’s?”92 He cites and discusses my article as an example of this 
unfortunate tax-is-special attitude, in a section of his article with the 
heading “The (Allegedly) Special Case of Tax Law.”93 
I hope it is clear by now that I consider Caron’s and Livingston’s 
characterizations of my position—as tax exceptionalist or not—to be 
equally plausible, and that as long as the substance of the position is 
understood I am indifferent to how it is labeled. But too great a focus 
on labels can blur the substance. Although Livingston presents my 
views as being in opposition to his own, I in fact concur with his 
articulation of his own position: “If tax law is not unique, it may be at 
the extreme end of a continuum . . . . In this view, all statutes would 
utilize the same interpretive methods, but the balance between 
methods would depend on where on the continuum the particular 
statute was located.”94 I am not sure why my position is deemed tax 
essentialism but his virtually identical position is not. 
To summarize: in statutory interpretation, and probably in a 
number of other legal contexts as well, tax is special, and it isn’t. 
Undoubtedly other areas of the law are similarly both special and 
ordinary, each in its own fashion. Does this view qualify as tax 
exceptionalism (or essentialism, or myopia)? One can argue either 
way, and as long as tax exceptionalism is not understood as a term of 
opprobrium, I doubt anything turns on the decision. 
CONCLUSION 
To hear the anti-exceptionalists tell it, tax exceptionalism is 
pervasive among tax professionals. It is strange, however, that even as 
tax exceptionalism has been pummeled in the law reviews and dealt a 
grievous blow by Mayo, no one has risen in defense of tax 
exceptionalism as a general attitude. When a particular position is 
identified as tax exceptionalist, the identification is always in service 
of the condemnation of the position and never in its defense. 
 
 91. Id. at 683. 
 92. Id. at 687. 
 93. Id. at 683–87. 
 94. Id. at 687. 
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And yet tax is special—at least in the sense that every legal 
specialty is special, but also in the stronger sense of being more 
special than the average specialty. Whether or not the I.R.C. “is the 
lengthiest, most complex . . . statute on the books today,”95 it is 
certainly one of the leading contenders for that honor. It is special, 
however, not only for its complexity but also for its function of 
financing the operations of the federal government, and for its direct 
impact on the personal finances of the vast majority of the American 
population.96 And the impact of the income tax goes far beyond 
bottom-line tax liabilities, because so many aspects of one’s life are 
relevant to the tax liability determination. This point was eloquently 
articulated by former IRS Commissioner Sheldon S. Cohen: 
“[T]axation, in reality, is life. If you know the position a person takes 
on taxes, you can tell their whole philosophy. The tax code, once you 
get to know it, embodies all the essence of life: greed, politics, power, 
goodness, charity.”97 One could not plausibly say the same of 
admiralty, antitrust, secured transactions, or even federal courts. 
Of course, it does not automatically follow from the special 
aspects of tax that, in any particular context, different legal rules 
should apply to tax than to the rest of the legal universe. As noted 
earlier, I favor a fairly strong presumption against special rules for 
tax, and I have no quarrel with the Court’s analysis in Mayo. But 
acknowledging all that, tax is still special, and one cannot rule out the 
 
 95. Ferguson et al., supra note 16, at 806. 
 96. As famously noted by Mitt Romney, in any given recent year only a little more than 
half of American households have paid any federal income tax. Mother Jones Releases Complete 
Video of Romney at Private Fund-Raiser, CAUCUS (Sept. 18, 2012, 2:47 P.M.), http://
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private-fund-raiser. The income tax, however, also directly affects the finances of tax return 
filers receiving refundable tax credits—including the filers of more than twenty-five million 
returns claiming the refundable earned income tax credit in 2010. Justin Bryan, Individual 
Income Tax Returns, 2010, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2012, at 5, 14 fig.H. Counting those with 
both positive and negative tax liabilities, in any given year the income tax directly affects the 
substantial majority of American households. In addition, the percentage of households with a 
net positive income tax liability over a twenty-year time frame is much higher than the 
percentage with a positive liability in any single year. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. 
& Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 23, 67–68 (2006). 
 97. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: 
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 289 (1987) (quoting 
Sheldon Cohen). Novelist David Foster Wallace was sufficiently impressed with Cohen’s 
observation to place it (very slightly altered) in the mouth of an admirable IRS official in his 
posthumously published novel, The Pale King. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THE PALE KING: AN 
UNFINISHED NOVEL 82 (2011). 
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possibility that upon occasion the force of that specialness may be 
enough to overcome the presumption against a special rule for tax. 
Whether the result should be labeled tax exceptionalism is debatable, 
because the same special rule should apply in any nontax area of the 
law in which the circumstances justifying the special tax rule also 
exist. In any event, if the position stated here makes me a tax 
exceptionalist, I gladly accept the label. 
